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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I present and discuss a theory of management control based on Transaction 
Cost Economics. This theory specifies the composition of various archetypal control struc-
tures, and links these to their respective habitat. These are: (1) arm’s length control; (2) 
machine control; (3) exploratory control; and (4) boundary control. The gist of the argument 
is that activities predictably differ in the control problems to which they give rise, whereas 
control archetypes differ in their problem-solving ability, and that alignments between the 
two can be explained by delineating the efficiency properties of the match. This approach 
has some interesting qualities. Its relatively simple theme seems to speak to a wide empiri-
cal domain, and can be used to make sense of a large set of different control practices. 
Furthermore, it offers a practicable way to address control structure effectiveness. Finally, 
the approach is empirically testable. 
 
Key words: Management control theory, Transaction cost economics 
 
1. Introduction 
As a field of academic endeavour, management control (MC) studies the processes and 
mechanisms that organizations use to influence the behaviour of actors within the organiza-
tion so as to contribute to the achievement of some pervasive objectives of that organization. 
This field of study has been approached from a wide variety of theoretical strands of thought, 
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and quite successfully so. Notions and causes from for instance systems theory, economics, 
organization theory, sociology, psychology, and anthropology have been shown to enhance 
our understanding of phenomena of control. Nevertheless, there is room for additional 
theorizing in this field, particularly at the more generic, encompassing level (see section 3.1 
of this paper, cf. also Fisher, 1995; Otley et al., 1995, Zimmerman, 2001). In this paper, I 
maintain that Transaction Cost Economics (TCE; Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985, 1996) has a 
contribution to make here, and I present and discuss a TCE-based theory of MC (Spekle, 
2001a, 2001b) to demonstrate this position. I will also discuss some opportunities for further 
work. 
2. A Transaction Cost Approach to Management Control 
TCE has already some history in MC (see for instance Colbert and Spicer, 1995; Johnson, 1983; 
Van der Meer-Kooistra, 1994; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000; Ouchi, 1979, 1980; 
Seal, 1993; Spicer and Ballew, 1983; Swieringa and Waterhouse, 1982; Tiessen and Water-
house, 1983). However, whereas most of the earlier contributions concentrated on specific 
control problems, specific cases, or specific control instruments, the usefulness of TCE 
extends well beyond the specific, and it is in fact a solid basis on which to build a more 
general, encompassing theory to support the study of MC structures. Although the reach of 
this approach extends beyond the individual organization to include control aspects of 
cooperative arrangements between firms (Speklé, 2001a, 2001b), I will focus here on MC 
within the confines of the hierarchy. Within these confines, I will emphasize control at the 
level of the organizational subsystems (e.g. divisions, departments, or more generally, more 
or less homogeneous centres of activities that are sufficiently important to warrant special-
ized control). Much of the argument has relevance also at different levels of analysis (mutatis 
mutandis) but it is at this level that many interesting problems reside. This section sketches 
the main tenets of the argument. 
 
2.1 The gist of the argument 
 
An organization depends on the contribution of a large number of individuals to achieve its 
aims. TCE suggests that MC structures can be understood as solutions to the coordination, 
adaptation, incentive and enforcement problems that arise in contracting for and controlling 
these contributions. These problems originate from two main sources: (1) the characteristics 
of human behaviour; and (2) the attributes of the activities in which the organization en-
gages, and the contributions required from the organization’s members to support these 
activities. On the behavioural side, TCE makes allowance for bounded rationality and oppor-
tunism. Bounded rationality refers to man’s limited cognitive and computational ability 
(Simon, 1945). Opportunism is “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985: 47), which 
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may include calculated efforts to mislead and deceive. The nature of the activities and the 
required contributions can be defined discriminatingly through their scores on three dimen-
sions: (1) uncertainty, or the extent to which the activities and desired contributions are 
amenable to ex ante programming; (2) the degree of asset specificity, or the extent to which 
alternative uses of investments made to support the activity involve opportunity losses; and 
(3) the intensity of ex post information asymmetry, or the ability to assess the true quality of 
actually delivered performance. Given bounded rationality and opportunism, these features 
are predictably associated with distinctive control problems that need to be dealt with. 
Organizations try to cope with these problems by adopting appropriate MC structures. These 
come in an overwhelming variety, but within this variety, a limited number of typical control 
patterns can be discerned: (1) arm’s length control, featuring outcome control based on 
market-derived standards or predefined contractual provisions; (2) machine control, which is 
administrative control based on codification of behaviour or predefined performance targets; 
(3) exploratory control that works from converging insights that accrue and spread during the 
process; and (4) boundary control that is proscriptive in nature, emphasizing actions to be 
avoided. These archetypal control structures differ in their problem-solving ability, which 
make them appropriate for the governance of some activities and contributions, but not for 
others. Moreover, they differ in respect of cost, and ultimately, an empirically observed 
alignment of an activity with a control structure is explained by delineating the relative 
efficiency properties of the match. Figure 1 summarizes the basic explanatory structure of 
this approach. 
 
Figure 1: The structure of TCE-based explanation 
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2.2 Effectiveness, efficiency, and remediableness 
 
TCE adopts a micro-analytical point of view in which the transaction is the basic unit of 
analysis. Control structure effectiveness (or rather: efficiency, which is a stronger form of 
effectiveness in that it presupposes effectiveness) is also studied at that level. TCE asserts 
that the design of control arrangements is mainly driven by the generic urge to economize on 
transaction costs. Transaction costs include the relatively straightforward costs of drafting, 
negotiating, and safequarding an agreement, but also –and foremost- the more elusive cost of 
maladaptation and adjustment that could be incurred in case of a mismatch between a 
transaction and its governance structure, resulting in the transaction drifting out of line 
because of self-serving and dysfunctional behaviour. Explaining observed control structures, 
thus, comes down to demonstrating their relative efficiency in serving their purpose, which is 
to increase the probability that the transaction leads to satisfactory outcomes. 
 This is a very flexible and scaleable approach. Its general logic can be applied to various 
specific research questions at different levels of aggregation and analysis. In TCE, the central 
concepts as ‘transactions’ and ‘contracting’ are broadly construed, and can meaningfully be 
used to describe any relationship in which parties expect something from one another and are 
prepared to give something in return. This includes for instance the relationship between the 
organization and its substantive parts –be they business units, divisions, departments, or 
otherwise-, as well as the relationship between senior and junior management within one of 
these parts, i.e. the kind of relationships MC is interested in. It also includes lateral relations 
between parts of the organization; relations that are beginning to attract increased attention 
in the literature (Van Helden et al., 2001; Hopwood, 1996; Otley, 1994). 
 But what about the assumption of efficiency? For surely, there is more to organization 
than efficiency, and reducing one’s explanations to motives of economizing may be consid-
ered rather procrustean indeed. The efficiency assumption, however, only applies to matters 
of contracting and control, not to the reasons organizations may have to engage in the 
activities that need to be controlled. The activities may be driven by a variety of motives, 
including purposes of a non-economizing nature. The approach suggested here accepts this, 
and works from these motives without questioning them. Only thereafter does the assumption 
of transaction cost efficiency come in: given what the organization wants from the activity, 
its control structure is designed in such a way to avoid wasting resources in getting the 
organization what it wants. This would seem sufficiently unobtrusive to accept it as part of 
the theory, at least until empirical evidence advises otherwise. 
 To assess transaction cost efficiency, TCE uses a comparative approach in which the 
properties and effects of the observed governance structure are confronted with those of 
alternative control arrangements that could realistically have been installed instead of the 
one actually chosen. The actual structure is considered efficient -and, consequently, ex-
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plained- if this analysis reveals that the actual structure is better equipped to deal with the 
contractual problems inherent in the transaction than the alternatives, i.e. that none of the 
feasible alternatives could be implemented with expected net gains. This ‘remediableness 
test’ (Williamson, 1996, 1999a, 1999b) can often be applied in a wholly qualitative way, 
which is quite useful because of the difficulties involved in measuring transaction costs. 
Especially the costs of maladaptation are notoriously hard to measure, because they are 
opportunity costs. Yet these tend to be the most important. In many cases, however, one is 
able to demonstrate that the adopted governance structure has some unique features that 
are essential in coping with the relevant contractual problems and that cannot be replicated 
within another mode of governance (except, perhaps, at the expense of prohibitive costs). If 
the potential transaction costs associated with these problems are evidently large, the 
explanation of the actual structure may be based solely on the unquantified amount of these 
costs, for exact measurement of self-evidently large transaction cost differentials may safely 
be regarded as redundant. Now it is true, of course, that any such assessment of efficiency is 
necessarily provisional. After all, it is always conceivable that there exists a superior, but 
hitherto ignored alternative. However, because the procedure urges the researcher to 
explicate the particulars of the efficiency assessment, it allows theoretical and empirical 
scrutiny and discussion of the argument. From an academic stance, this is good enough. 
 
2.3 The attributes of the activity and their implications 
 
The effects of uncertainty: programmable versus non-programmable contributions 
 
Uncertainty is a condition that can arise from many sources, including market dynamics, 
disturbances in the external environment, environmental complexity, task uncertainty, task 
complexity, and unfamiliarity. However, whatever the source, the effects are similar: desired 
contributions are not amenable to up front programming, and maintaining flexibility to allow 
adaptation to events as they unfold and to information as it accrues becomes imperative. This 
basic insight –which also has a long history in MC, albeit under different names and in various 
guises1 -allows organizational activity to be grouped in two broad categories: (1) programma-
ble activities, i.e. activities for which the organization possesses sufficient knowledge and 
information to decide in advance on the way in which they are to be executed in order to 
achieve success, or activities for which the outcomes that may realistically be expected to 
result from them can be defined ex ante; and (2) non-programmable activities, i.e. activities 
for which the organization lacks the a priori ability and experience to relate actions to 
outcomes. The availability of norms and standards in the first group permits a fairly compre-
hensive ex ante articulation of the characteristics of the contribution that is required from 
                                                 
1 Early references would include for instance Burns and Stalker (1961) and Galbraith (1973). 
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the members of the organization, and contracting for that contribution can be reasonably 
complete. Control, therefore, can be prescriptive or authoritative in nature, featuring rules 
of behaviour, specific instructions, and relatively rigid performance targets, and focusing on 
assuring compliance to these pre-imposed norms. In the second group, in contrast, it is not 
possible to specify required contributions in advance. Due to the absence of ex ante stan-
dards, contracts must be of a general thrust nature, emphasizing a general commitment or 
sketching the broad confines within which performance ought to fit, rather than delineating a 
precisely specified contribution. 
 
Asset specificity: differential access to market discipline 
 
Asset specificity refers to the size of the opportunity losses that arise if the (physical or 
human) investments made to support the activity are to be put to alternative uses or users. 
The degree of asset specificity is directly linked to the marketability of the investments. It is 
low in case of general purpose assets for which a large and active market exists. Conversely, 
it is high in the case of specialized, custom-built assets for which there is no readily accessi-
ble alternative source of supply or demand. Activities of low asset specificity are expected to 
be governed by the market mechanism, and are outside the scope of this paper. Here, our 
concern is with activities that fall somewhere in the range of moderate to high asset specific-
ity. Moderate asset specificity implies the availability of a limited number of more or less 
comparable alternative sources of supply or demand. This number is too small to consign 
control to the ‘invisible hand’, but large enough to reduce the leeway for opportunism, either 
by lending credibility to the threat to take one’s business elsewhere when confronted with 
opportunistic behaviour, or by providing relevant performance benchmarks that can be used 
for control purposes. In either case, market discipline -though not the sole control device- 
can be part of the control structure. This changes when asset specificity approaches the 
higher end of the continuum. Then, competition erodes up to the point of non-existence, and 
control has to come entirely from within the contractual relation: market-based discipline 
thus gives way to administrative control, ultimately to be supplanted by it. 
 
Ex post information asymmetry: assessing the quality of delivered contributions 
 
The third variable is the level of ex post information asymmetry, i.e. the extent to which the 
organization is able to observe and to assess perceptively the true quality of actually deliv-
ered contributions. The relevance of this variable is confined to the category of non-
programmable activities; in the case of the more programmable ones the required informa-
tion must by definition be available beforehand. Non-programmable activities carry a certain 
amount of indeterminacy as a result of uncertainty. This condition may dissolve over time 
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when in the process of contract execution, information accrues on the actual state of the 
world and more intimate knowledge on the particulars of the activities becomes available, 
allowing the organization to ‘recognize the quality of performance when it sees it’. If these 
emerging insights spread through the organization, gradually becoming common knowledge, 
post hoc performance appraisal may be fairly uncontroversial. In this case, the organization is 
able to evaluate performance using emergent standards that are shared (or at least known) 
by those involved in the process. This is a situation of relatively low ex post information 
asymmetry. If, however, the information on performance and contextual details that accrues 
during the process of delivering the contribution cannot be communicated to other members 
of the organization in a reliable way, information asymmetry remains high. This situation may 
for instance arise when the relevant information is highly specialized in character (e.g. expert 
information), or when it is not possible to protect the information from opportunistic manipu-
lation by the sender at acceptable cost. Then, the organization is effectually unable to assess 
the quality of performance, even after it has been delivered. 
 
2.4 Linking control problems and solutions 
 
The attributes of the activity to be controlled are related to predictable control problems, 
and scoring the activity on these attributes allows identification of the associated set of 
expected control problems. These different problem sets require different solutions, i.e. a 
different MC structure. It has often been noted that control structures are compositions of a 
large number of different elements (Ansari, 1977; Flamholtz, 1983; 1996; Lowe and Puxty, 
1989: Otley, 1980, 1999, 2001; Rotch, 1993). These elements include organizational design, 
the allocation of responsibility and accountability, planning and budgeting, reward and 
incentive structures, information systems, performance evaluation practices, and more. MC 
structures as they exist in reality differ with respect to the elements they include. Also, they 
differ in the relative importance they attach to these elements. Moreover, the elements as 
such can be designed and used in many different ways. The implication would be, that MC 
structure variety is potentially bewildering. However, in reality, control structures tend to 
cluster in a limited number of typical patterns: MC structures come in a large variety, but 
they are in fact variations on a not so large number of common themes. This allows empirical 
variety to be reduced to differences among a more manageable number of representative 
archetypal MC structures. The next step, then, is to describe these control archetypes in 
terms of their elementary composition and their distinctive problem-solving ability, and to 
match these in a discriminating way with the control needs that are associated with particu-
lar activities as defined by their scores on the attributes asset specificity, programmability, 
and ex post information asymmetry. Figure 2 outlines the resulting perspective. 
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Figure 2: Archetypes of control and their habitat 
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Arm’s length control 
 
In the group of programmable activities, where control takes a prescriptive orientation, the 
emphasis will be on compliance to the predefined norms and standards. When asset specific-
ity is moderate, promulgation and sometimes even enforcement of these norms and standards 
may partly be left to the market, and managerial involvement in control may be limited 
correspondingly. Because in this situation there is at least some competition between alterna-
tive sources of supply and demand2, the question as to what constitutes adequate perform-
ance is answered in part by the market, thus giving contracting parties some common refer-
ence point against which to assess the reasonableness of their expectations and on which to 
base the control structure. However, asset specificity being moderate, competition is not 
strong enough to provide self-sufficient safeguards, and additional control mechanisms will be 
installed. Within arm’s length control, these include continuous access to the rich repertoire 
                                                 
2 Strictly speaking, this need not always be true. Conceivably, asset specificity may also be 
low in absence of outside competition. This would be the case when some unique monopolis-
tic asset is deployable in several alternative ways. This situation, however, has limited 
empirical relevance and may, therefore, safely be ignored. 
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of managerial intervention, probably in conjunction with performance-based compensation 
plans to increase goal congruence between the contracting parties. However, typical for 
arm’s length control is that the intervention repertoire is only called upon in case perform-
ance drifts out of line with the market, allowing ‘detached’ control and providing transaction 
cost benefits by economizing on management’s time. Because in this archetype the contribu-
tor retains significant autonomy, the term arm’s length control seems an appropriate label. 
Arm’s length control is associated with generic, relatively unspecific activities for which an 
outside market exists, but that are internalized nonetheless3. 
 
Machine control 
 
High programmability is associated with prescriptive control and a focus on compliance to 
pre-set norms and standards. However, given a high degree of asset specificity, these norms 
and standards cannot be culled from market interaction as in arm’s length control, but need 
to be defined within the organization. The resulting structure strongly resembles the mecha-
nistic organization described by Burns and Stalker (1961), the machine bureaucracy portrayed 
by Mintzberg (1983), and Ouchi’s bureaucracy (1979). It features standardization and regula-
tion of behaviour, codification of budget targets, detailed monitoring, systematic measure-
ment of performance on pre-defined dimensions, and clearly identified areas of accountabil-
ity, usually mirrored in the organizational structure. Its emphasis on programming, progress 
monitoring, and correcting deviations from pre-set directions suggests the label machine 
control for this structure. 
 The machine control archetype is a structure that is associated with mature programs 
and routine activities. This archetype can be refined by distinguishing action oriented and 
result oriented machine control types. In the action oriented approach, control is predomi-
nantly achieved via codification of actions and supervising observance of the rules and 
instructions, whereas control of the result oriented kind hinges primarily on target-setting, 
accountability, and reward structures that serve to encourage target-directed behaviour. This 
distinction has been dealt with quite extensively in the literature -see for instance Merchant’s 
results controls and action accountability controls (Merchant, 1982, 1985), and Ouchi’s 
behaviour control versus output control (Ouchi, 1977)- and need no amplification here, 
except for the efficiency properties of the alternatives. 
                                                 
3 There may be many reasons to internalize such activities. One example may be the presence 
of site specificity, making internalization sensible, but still allowing performance benchmark-
ing. Another reason could be the wish to preserve some in-house production capacity to serve 
as a credible threat in the dealings with outside suppliers. Preservation of a ‘window on 
technology’ to facilitate future entry in markets not currently considered vital may also 
account for internalization of activities that are relatively unspecific. 
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 In many instances, there will be no real choice between action oriented control and the 
result oriented approach, simply because the available information enables the one and not 
the other (Merchant, 1982, 1985). Then, straightforward feasibility considerations will be 
decisive. But when both approaches are feasible, result control will usually reign for it tends 
to require less elaborate structuring –thus relieving the pressure on bounded rationality-, is 
likely to demand less higher level involvement, and is more supportive of adaptation. The 
latter aspect is important when –low uncertainty notwithstanding- there may still be some 
unanticipated disturbances or opportunities demanding a flexible response. The result control 
variant may rely on a performance-dependent reward system to provide the incentive to 
elicit that response, whereas the action oriented alternative has no such option and needs to 
revert to time-consuming hierarchical redefinition of required behaviour. 
 
Exploratory control 
 
Low programmability implies the inability to define in advance the attainable outcomes of 
the activity. Also, it implies that any up front selection of the courses of action that are most 
likely to contribute to satisfactory outcomes is bound to require revision along the way. 
Explicit contracting for concrete actions or contributions is not feasible, and such activities 
must start out with little preconceived guidance, i.e. as steps on an uncharted route, the 
travelling of which requires considerable discretionary authority at the level of the travellers. 
Following that route, however, is a learning process, and in that process, participants acquire 
an increasingly deeper understanding of the activity and how they should go about with it. 
This understanding arises from experience, and is thus likely to be asymmetrically distributed 
(it is only gained by those who actually had the experience) and dispersed (different individu-
als have different tasks in the activity and their experiences relate to different aspects of the 
project). Sharing of information, then, becomes vital to decide on the next step on the route 
and to encourage a sense of coherence in participants’ efforts. 
 Prompt and undistorted sharing of information, however, may conflict with perceived 
self-interest, because individuals may expect that this information will not only be used for 
learning purposes and as input for emergent patterns of action, but also for ex post evalua-
tion of individual performance. In that case, one must expect the information to be biased in 
an attempt to inflate the perception of the quality of performance. In that process, relevant 
details may be suppressed or become twisted, thus diminishing the value of the information 
flows for evaluative purposes, but also for learning purposes. 
 To find a way out of this dilemma, formal instruments of control have not much to offer, 
and exploratory control is highly informal in nature. It is quite strongly related to Mintzberg’s 
adhocracy (1983). It is also closely akin to the organic organization described by Burns and 
Stalker (1961). It can be found in innovation-driven (parts of) organizations, but also in 
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orgnizations going through some major transformation that upsets the relevance of existing 
know-how and routines. A typical feature of exploratory control is the absence of clearly 
defined and demarcated individual responsibilities. Rather, it blends permeable matrix-like 
structures with fluid project teams that are formed and dismantled according to perceived 
needs as they emerge. Individual responsibilities follow assignments and, like the assignments 
themselves, are in a permanent state of flux, not getting the time to sink in. Responsibilities, 
thus, remain unclear. In part, this is a predictable consequence of the impossibility to define 
in advance what to expect from those involved in the organization, and as such, it may be 
seen as part of the problem. But it is also part of the solution in that it is a means to encour-
age a problem-solving attitude, for unclear responsibilities make it harder to refer a problem 
to someone else as being his or her responsibility (cf. Burns and Stalker, 1961). Essentially, a 
problem becomes the responsibility of the individual that just happened to stumble upon it 
first. Solving the problem, then, is likely to extend beyond the capacity of that individual, 
and he or she must often solicit help from other members of the organization. This serves as a 
catalyst for information sharing and learning, and it also creates an atmosphere in which 
cooperation is self-enforcing: next time, the shoe may be on the other foot, and providing 
help is the best strategy to ensure receiving help on future occasions. Furthermore, it creates 
an incentive to strive for at least satisfactory performance. Because individuals in this 
structure depend upon one another for the accomplishment of their own tasks and duties, 
substandard achievement by some individual tends to interfere with the performance of 
direct colleagues on whom the individual depends himself. Coupled with the organic informa-
tion flows that accompany the multitude of cooperative relationships that arises, opportunis-
tic inclinations (e.g. shirking, withholding or manipulating information) become hard to 
sustain (cf. Marginson, 1999). Moreover, higher level management itself will be involved quite 
closely in the entire process in a supportive role, reinforcing strategic intentions, giving 
advice, questioning decisions, asking for explanations et cetera. This involvement is valuable 
in that it serves coordination and information sharing. But in addition, it ensures that infor-
mation relevant for assessment of individual performance reaches the proper hierarchical 
levels. 
 In this structure, it is not necessary to explicate in advance the criteria that will be used 
in individual performance evaluation. Simple, open-ended exhortations (‘do your best’) 
suffice. The relevant criteria emerge in the process and are known to those involved, because 
they are part of that very process. Moreover, individuals know that the organization is well-
equipped to assess ex post the quality of individual’s contribution to the longer-term devel-
opment of the organization. Then, a simple ‘do your best’ becomes a meaningful message.  
 It must be noted that exploratory control is a markedly indulgent structure. It may be 
sufficient to activate goal-consistent behaviour, but it does not necessarily produce the level 
of effort the organization desires. Its reliance on cooperation and mutual adjustment foster 
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close personal relations, which may easily create a lenient atmosphere in which it is hard to 
blow the whistle. In addition, this archetype’s demand for extensive communication and 
consultation is resource-consuming. A similar remark applies to its unstructured routing of 
problems, which cannot assure smooth problem-handling. That is why as soon as insights into 
the properties of required contributions settle, elements of machine control gain importance, 
ultimately to supplant the exploratory form. But until then, exploratory control may be the 
best one can do, which explains its existence. 
 
Boundary control 
 
For non-programmable activities that feature incorrigibly high levels of ex post information 
asymmetry, it is not possible to define and evaluate performance, not even after the contri-
bution has been made. This situation arises in the control of activities that require input of 
highly specialized knowledge and skills. The treasury function could be a good example. It is 
quite common that this function is largely beyond the reach of rest of the organization 
(including its top management), for the financial literacy required to understand the particu-
lars of the treasury function and its performance is often present only in the treasury de-
partment itself (cf. Helliar, 1998). In that case, the rest of the organization is unable to 
assess the quality of treasury’s performance and, a fortiori, unable to provide much guidance 
to that department. However, even though one may be unable to specify what one expects 
from the activity, one will usually have at least some notion as to the factors that may 
actually jeopardize the business. These factors become the primary object of control. Thus, 
the aim of control shifts from ensuring desired contributions to the prevention of unwanted 
actions or outcomes. As suggested by Simons (1995), such proscriptive control may be labelled 
boundary control. 
 Because the information asymmetry that defies performance assessment will also defy a 
reasonably complete ex ante specification of actions to be avoided, and because that same 
asymmetry stands in the way of systematic detection of rule-breaking behaviour, boundary 
control must be expected to leave considerable room for dysfunctional behaviour. Neither is 
it likely to bring much coherence to the efforts of those involved in the organization. There-
fore, boundary control is very much the structure of last resort, only to be expected in 
conditions where more positive guidance cannot be given and enforced. 
3. Discussion 
The theoretical approach advanced in this paper is obviously still in its infancy. It is very 
much the result of a ground-clearing exercise, and a lot of work remains to be done. In the 
meantime, it would seem that the theory advanced here has a number of qualities that make 
it worth considering. For one, its relatively simple theme turned out to speak to a wide 
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empirical domain, and can be used to make sense of remarkably different control structures 
in a consistent and coherent way. Thus, it offers a degree of unification that is quite rare in 
MC-thinking. Furthermore, the approach advanced here suggests a pragmatic way to deal with 
control structure effectiveness. Finally, the approach is empirically testable, at least in 
principle. These qualities will be discussed at some length in this section. I will also examine 
some of the weaker spots of the approach to suggest a potentially rewarding agenda for 
further constructive research in this area. Particularly, the relative neglect of social mecha-
nisms of control (or rather their reinterpretation in terms of economic self-interestedness) 
and the underdeveloped position of learning effects need to be addressed. 
 
3.1 Unification 
 
A classic motive underlying much theorizing is the quest for unification, i.e. the desire to 
subsume apparently different types of phenomena under a single explanatory scheme by 
showing that they are in fact manifestations of the same set of explaining factors or forces 
(cf. Mäki, 2000). Increasing unification involves scope expansion, that is expansion of the 
domain of phenomena explained by a particular theory. It also relates to coherence within 
the explanatory scheme –which is a precondition for unification4. 
 In MC, however, unification does not seem to be particularly high on the research 
agenda. The larger part of the research efforts of the last decade or so concentrates on 
specific issues in a specific, restricted setting. Studies that strive for a systematically ar-
ranged and broadly applicable set of insights that is relevant across a larger empirical domain 
are quite unusual indeed. This is not to suggest that one of these types of study if inherently 
better than the other. Obviously, both are needed to further the understanding of MC. But 
they should preferably develop in consort. One needs deep and rich, specific knowledge to 
feed into one’s general understanding of what goes on in MC, but one simultaneously needs 
general insights to make sense of specific observations and to decide on what is important 
there, and what is merely incidental. Now the point is that whereas much important work is 
being done at the specific level, the generic side of MC less well-developed. Research efforts 
aiming at more general theories would certainly not come amiss. 
 Against this background, the transaction cost approach to MC may help to redress the 
imbalance. Its relatively simple theme speaks to an exceptionally wide empirical domain, and 
can be used to make sense of quite a large set of remarkably different control structures. 
Moreover, it does so in a consistent and coherent, unified way. This is perhaps most visible in 
the treatment of exploratory control. This treatment brings back the explanation of control in 
                                                 
4 It does, however, not imply theoretical monism, if only because of the multitude of differ-
ent explanatory questions that may be asked within a discipline. Different questions may 
require different theories. The idea of unification, thus, is question-laden.  
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conditions where neither required behaviour, nor desired performance can be specified in 
advance in the realm of ‘the usual’. Whereas previous explanations have tended to relegate 
control in such circumstances to the ceremonial and ritual (Ouchi, 1979, 1980), to the politi-
cal (Hofstede, 1981), or to the domain of hope (Merchant, 1982), my analysis suggests that 
the relevance of the conventional repertoire of control extends well beyond the limited 
domain of programmable activities, and that even in difficult circumstances of ambiguity, the 
functioning of control maintains much of its familiar rationale. Control in these conditions, 
thus, can be studied from the same general premises and mechanisms (such as the assump-
tion that extrinsic motivators are important, the reliance on economic incentives to motivate 
desired behaviour, the perceived need for monitoring et cetera) that are called upon to 
explain control in circumstances where contracting can be more complete and explicit. 
Control in ambiguous conditions, then, is no longer eccentric, but just another variation on a 
well-known theme. 
 
3.2 Effectiveness 
 
The view of MC as a means to support achievement of organizational goals implies that 
explaining MC involves a demonstration of the actual contribution of observed MC practices to 
the attainment of these goals. However, although there is “universal acceptance that the 
Holy Grail for management control systems researchers is effectiveness” (Machin, 1983: 37), 
an explicit examination of effectiveness issues is quite rare –perhaps because Holy Grails tend 
to be hard to find. 
 Although I would certainly not claim to have found the Holy Grail, TCE’s remediableness 
criterion does move beyond paying lip-service to effectiveness, and it does offer a reasonably 
concrete and practicable procedure to approach this issue. The remediableness test makes 
remarkably little assumptions as to organizational goals and motives. It merely requires 
acceptance of a general preference for more effective structures over less effective ones: 
organizations prefer structures that actually work to structures that are less helpful (or more 
wasteful) in getting them what they want. And the idea of comparing an actual structure with 
realistically conceivable alternatives, and thinking these through in terms of their differential 
effects, is simple, widely applicable, and instructive. At the very least, it gives the analysis a 
clear sense of direction, forcing the researcher to explicate how the structure deals with the 
relevant control problems, and how this compares to the problem-solving ability of alterna-
tive structures. The mere act of explicating may be illuminating. It simultaneously provides a 
basis for academic scrutiny and, consequently, a safeguard against sloppy reasoning. 
 It is, however, also a somewhat instrumental approach in that it studies effectiveness at 
relatively low levels of aggregation. It focuses on the immediate goals that pertain at the 
level of analysis chosen. This level may vary depending on the research question of the 
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particular study, but it will usually be well below the level of the organization as a whole 
(e.g. control of the R&D department, control of the treasury function or, more generally, 
control of some subset of organizational activity). The approach, then, runs the risk of 
glossing over more high-brow questions as to the contribution of MC to overall organizational 
effectiveness. This is not to say that the larger picture is ignored altogether -the place of the 
activity in the larger organization and its strategic role will affect the goals of the activity, 
which enter the analysis accordingly. However, this cannot guarantee a full consideration of 
all relevant aspects at the organizational level. But it is operational, and this mere fact puts 
the approach ahead of most alternative approaches. 
 
3.3 Testability 
 
The theoretical perspective advanced in this paper has been presented without empirical 
backing. This leaves open a number of important issues, including questions as to the link 
between the characteristics of the activities and predicted control problems (are these 
problems really the ones that count and can they really be attributed to the characteristics of 
the activities as described by the variables of the theory?). Also, the representational validity 
and efficiency of the archetypes is open to inquiry (do the archetypes describe actual control 
structures sufficiently accurately and is their assumed situational effectiveness empirically 
demonstrable?). Clearly, a lot of empirical work remains to be done. 
 Empirical substantiation (or the reverse, of course), however, will not come easy. As they 
now stand, many of the concepts that figure in the theory are somewhat hazy, their sub-
stance and meaning being suggested rather than defined. Moreover, the scale on which to 
score the variables is quite rough and the boundaries of the intervals are left implicit. And 
the archetypes are constructs that help to recognize and expound general tendencies, but it 
is entirely possible that one comes across some configuration of control that does not fall 
neatly into any of the pre-identified classes. For these reasons, the application of this theory 
is bound to command considerable interpretative efforts from the researcher to deal with the 
shades of grey one is bound to come across. 
 Although these problems are quite real, they may turn out relatively easy to manage 
when encountered in a specific empirical setting. Asset specificity for instance is an expan-
sive concept that can mean different things to different people in different situations at 
different times. Trying to anticipate these different potential manifestations of that condition 
and folding these back into a more precise definition of the term is unlikely to make it any 
clearer. In any case, such efforts are not very useful when in some particular context, the 
specific meaning of asset specificity is sufficiently obvious to be beyond controversy. A similar 
argument applies when it comes to defining the boundaries between the scoring intervals. 
Whereas in general, it may well be impossible to identify the exact point where, say, pro-
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grammability shifts from low to high, it may be perfectly clear how to score a specific activity 
in a specific context on this dimension. And even when the appropriate score is not obvious, 
it is far easier to settle any discussion that might arise in the concrete context at hand than 
in general, abstract terms. Then, there is not much gain in trying to correct definitional 
vagueness up front. There may even be some danger involved in early attempts to attain 
precision: rough definitions have the advantage that non-standard practices -the ones that 
are likely to be overlooked when drafting one’s definitions but that may nevertheless be 
important in understanding what is going on- may relatively easily be incorporated in the 
analysis, whereas such practices may remain unobserved when working from strict but 
insufficiently rich definitions. Definitions may provide focus, helping to see things more 
clearly, but they may also focus too much, resulting in things not being seen at all. There-
fore, further refinement and elimination of ambiguities is better left to future applications. 
 As a result, the transaction cost approach to MC is not particularly well-suited to inform 
large scale, cross-section survey-type research. Such research requires the design of measures 
for the independent variables (the attributes of the activities) that hold across a variety of 
different firms, and thus demands clear-cut definitions. In absence of these, small sample, 
case-like research is the natural way to proceed5. And this would seem a practicable way, 
too. It has also been the path taken in empirical research in TCE in general –for similar 
reasons-, and although this literature is full of struggles with problems of operationalization, 
it also shows that applying TCE is both feasible and helpful (cf. Masten, 1996; Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997; Shelanski and Klein, 1995, for recent overviews of empirical research in TCE). 
And by now, these case-like and single industry applications are so numerous that they 
amount to an enviably solid empirical basis for TCE’s conjectures in general. 
 
3.4 Some opportunities for further work 
 
The transaction cost theory of MC as it figures in this paper works from a rather shallow 
notion of human behaviour. The behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and oppor-
tunism hardly even begin to capture the drives and motives of human behaviour, and neglect 
much of the characteristics we believe to be valuable in understanding human agency. The 
need for recognition and respect, the desire to belong, the wish to trust and be trusted –to 
name but a few factors that ‘everybody knows’ to be important- play no explicit role in the 
explanations offered. Also, the proposed theory treats human behaviour as atomistic, under-
playing the influence of social context and interaction and representing an ‘undersocialized 
                                                 
5 There is another reason to support case-like work: assessment of control structure effec-
tiveness requires a deep understanding of what the organization wants from its activities. 
Such understanding is unlikely to result from processing questionnaires or from any other data 
collection instrument usually relied on in large sample research.  
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view of human action’ (Granovetter, 1985). The consequences of this are potentially far-
reaching, because MC operates within an intricate network of social relations, and it is at 
least plausible to assume that the functioning of MC is somehow conditioned by these rela-
tions, and vice versa. 
 However, although the social is plainly underdeveloped in the approach as it now stands6, 
it does not actually ignore social mechanisms and processes altogether. Rather, it reinter-
prets mechanisms that are usually considered to belong to the domain of the social in eco-
nomic terms. Recall the earlier examination of exploratory control (section 2.4). This treat-
ment stresses the effects of cooperation, mutual dependency, and personal relations; 
phenomena that would certainly qualify as social. The effects of these phenomena (such as 
the increased propensity to cooperate, the pressure to perform, and the emergence of a 
lenient atmosphere), however, are attributed to (economic) self-interest. This, of course, 
meets uneasily with common knowledge. In a way, the social is being abducted by economics. 
But then, the effects themselves are not contrary to common experience. Assuming that 
these effects as such are satisfactorily dealt with in the approach as it now stands, incorpo-
rating the social in the theory would be a refinement rather than an extension. Such a 
refinement would still be important, though, for it would increase the causal articulation of 
the approach, improving the insights it provides in the causal processes and mechanisms at 
work (Mäki, 2000). Also, it would realign the explanation more closely with common sense. 
This would seem a challenging task for further work. 
 Another interesting opportunity for further research derives from the largely static 
nature of the approach, which it shares with its intellectual ancestor TCE. TCE emphasizes 
comparative statics and offers equilibrium explanations rather than an understanding of the 
processes involved (Hodgson, 1998; Pratten, 1997; Robins, 1987). This also holds for the 
approach advanced here. This makes it difficult to come to grips with the interactions be-
tween control and the activities. That is problematic, because control itself may affect some 
of the variables that are treated (provisionally) as exogenous in the approach as it now 
stands. Especially learning effects seem pertinent. Learning is likely to affect programmabil-
ity as one of the key variables (which, in turn, affects the relative effectiveness of the 
control structure in use), whereas control itself can be expected to influence learning. 
Moreover, different control packages are likely to impinge differently on learning. To be sure, 
some of this is already present in the approach in its current state of development. Explora-
tory control is explicitly based on the anticipation of learning and the resulting transforma-
                                                 
6 This goes for most of the work in MC. Social processes and their effect on MC have received 
only cursory attention in the literature at large, and inasmuch as they have been dealt with, 
their treatment has been pioneering and indicative, rather than concrete and well-developed 
(cf. for instance Chua, 1988; Covaleski and Aiken, 1986; Covaleski et al., 1996; Hopwood, 
1983). 
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tion of ex ante uncertainty in a situation of relative certainty ex post. Also, the composition 
of this structure can largely be understood as being designed to enable and stimulate learning 
and to support dissemination of the resulting insights. However, this is still underdeveloped, 
and more explicit attention for the interaction between control and learning may make a 
valuable contribution, not just to the current perspective, but to the literature at large (cf. 
Otley, 1994; Scapens and Bromwich, 2001 for recent calls to pay more attention to the 
relation between organizational learning and control). 
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